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Transportation services are a vital function in our metropol-
itan areas. The creation of the special district has served
to establish an effective mechanism for the administration
of public commercialized services. Transportation is one of
these services that benefit under the administration of such
a government corporation. This thesis examines the rationale
supporting special district government and then illustrates
the impact of public transportation authorities through
several case studies.
By examining several urban areas where transportation author-
ities have been established, it is shown through a set of
criteria how the authority has succeeded in bringing the
urban area closer to the provision of optimum transportation.
services. An analysis of past experiences shows what can
be. done to improve transportation authorities. The analysis
also illustrates that Federal transportation policy has been
deficient.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Special districts are the most diverse and least
studied of local governments in the nation.
The average citizen is affected by a form of government
which has a large impact upon him. He attends schools, rides
transit, uses bridges, obtains his water and sewerage services,
and enjoys the parks and waterways of this form of government.
He also pays the tolls, taxes, fares, and assessments con-
trolled by this same form of government for the facilities it
owns and operates. In many cases, the citizen is not cogni-
zant of the existence of this government, nor does he realize
the full extent of the powers this government possesses, a
government in which he may not have any representation or
control.
This government is known as special districts and public
authoritie s..
The :apecial district is a relatively modern form of
government in this country. Consequently, the special dis-
trict is the least understood among our hierarchy of govern-
ments. It was created to fill a void in traditional forms
of government.. It is still in the process of evolution, as
there are few special districts having the same structure,
powers, etc..
Concurrent with the special district issue is that of
the "metropolitan transportation problem." The transportation
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problem has always existed to some extent. Man has always
sought ways to transport both himself and his products more
tfficiently and more economically. Over the course of time,
discoveries were made that enabled him to do this more effec-
tively. Subsequently, this affected both his life style and
his civilization. He was able to move away from his first
means of transport, the sea, to build his villages and cities
inland. Further progress in transportation technology allowed
him to expand his cities while permitting him to continue his
normal daily routine. The two most significant developments
in relation to the city have been rail and automotive trans-
port. But with the rapid growth in population and the extreme
concentrations of employment, these developments alone could
no longer serve man's transportation needs efficiently. In
addition, a jurisdictional problem arose in that many present
day local governments do not cooperate with one another in
solving the transportation problem. Distrust, politics,. and
home-rule reclusion have served to prevent metropolitan coop-
eration in transportation. Local units of government in
many cases would not recognize that the whole affects the
part just as the part affects the whole in transportation
related matters. The suburban automobile-dominated culture
ignores the public transportation systems that are so vital
to the central cities. If the central city should die because
of the inefficiency of its public transit, then so would the
suburbs. There are few suburban municipalities that are
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completely self-sufficient and independent from their res-
pective central cities. In urban America both today and in
the future, public transrortation is the key.
This thesis examines special districts and their appli-
cation to a part of the 'metropolitan transportation problem."
In particular, it will look at a unique and apparently suc-
cessful way in which special districts have alleviated some
of the public transportation problems- in major urban areas.
The various cases used will attempt to illustrate what can
be done to cure some of the transit ills in metropolitan
areas by observing the impact on those cities selected.
Preceeding the case studies is an analysis and 1history of
special district government. Included will be presented
some of the advantages and disadvantages of special district
government as compared to other traditional forms, a com-
parison of the differences between the two, together with
the factors influencing the creation, proliferation, and the
permanence of special districts.
A comprehensive analysis of the subject is not the in-
tention here. Such an analysis is beyond the capabilities
of any one author, especially within the short period of
time and the constrained resources available for this thesis.
Rather, I hope that transit special districts will be further
studied with this thesis contributing to the total body of
knowledge on the subject. In addition, this thesis does not
attempt to suggest exact guidelines and recommendations, but
only presents the observations derived from my study of tran-
OW-Li
sit special districts, and should only demonstrate the need
for greater study of transportation authorities and for re-
lated policy development.
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Chapter II
Special Districts and Public Authorities
The structure of American government is no longer a
simple democracy in the general sense of the word. This is
a fact that most Americans will acknowledge. The point can
be taken a step further in that neither is it a simple repub-
lic. Within the past two centuries, the basic structure of
government in the United States has retained its significance.
Yet, the nation has increased its size from a federation of
thirteen original states to the present fifty states and
territories. But it is the cumulative influence of the Federal
and state governments that have led to the creation of several
subordinate levels of government. As more and more local
governments have been created, and as various powers and
functions have been delegated to them for the various rationale
and purposes set forth, local government has become a puzzle
to many simply due to the vast numbers of them. The Cali-
fornia Institute for Local Self-government reports that there
are 81,000 units of local government in this country.1
However, this is an improvement upon the 116,000 nnits of
government reported in 1960.2
The difference between these two figures is the result
of a change in the number of one particular level of govern-
ment: special districts. Bollens, a noted authority on special
districts, found that 79,000 out of 116,000 governmental units
in the United States are special districts.3 Special districts
outnumber other forms of government in 35 states.4 In
California, there are five times as many special-districts
as there are cities.5 Statistics indicate that thirteen out
of every twenty governments in this country are special dis-
tricts, eleven in the school category and two in the non-
school category. 6
One may ask why is there a proliferation of special dis-
trict governments? Why aren tt the traditional forms suitable,
posing a need for a supplementary level. The answer lies in
the reality that general purpose governments (e.g. state,
county, municipality) do not adequately provide specific ser-
vices, This is further compounded by the fact that some ser-
vices require some form of areawide coordination which local
governments cannot achieve.
Besides special districts there are several other solutions
to the handling of metropolitan problems. Among some of these
are the familiar urban county, city-county consolidation,
joint service agreements, regional councils, annexation, and
metropolitan federation. The issue with these is that they
vary inversely with respect to their effectiveness and accept-
ability. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations
supports the metropolitan federation as the most effective,
but they also proceed to say that it is also the most difficult
to implement. (See Appendix.) Experience has indicated that
just the opposite is true for informal cooperation between
units of local govenment. On the scale of regional service
delivery approaches, the special district is the middle-of-
the-road, which indicates why it has been so overwhelmingly
preferred among the various other solutions.
Problems with the traditional government approach
The increase in the numbes of special districts may be
"symptomatic of weaknesses in other governments."7  This notion
has been the primary catalyst for the creation of special dis-
tricts. In many ways, local general purpose governments are
not suitable or cannot sufficiently supply particular services
which are public in nature. The aspects in which local govern-
ments are unsuitable include:
--Area: often the desired service district does not coincide
with any existing local government. The territory of the local
government may be larger or smaller than the desired service
boundary. In many of these cases, there are many political
subdivisions hindering any regional provision of services.
These individual decisionmaking units act in an exclusionary
manner, attending only to its own needs. However appropriate
for its own local jurisdiction, "the cumulative effect of
judgements made in isolation or on a limited cooperative
basis is sometimes detrimental to the well-being of the metro-
politan area as a whole." Another author, de Torres, indicates
the need for services on a metropolitan rather than on the
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present local scale.
During the past 30 years, the wave of urbanization has
added well over 65 million inhabitants to America's
cities -- most of them in the suburbs. In 1940, there
were close to 73 million inhabitants in 140 '!etropol-
itan areas," that is, urban areas with a population
over 50,000. These urban dwellers represented 48% of
the entire American population. By 1970, the metro-
politan population had risen to over 136 million, or
67% of the U.S. population; it was domiciled in 233
metropogitan areas and accounted for.76% of the nationts
income.
--Finances and functions: one of-the most constraining obsta-
cles faced by general purpose governments is finance. Many
local governments have chartered or state imposed tax/debt
limitations. The governmental unit is legally restricted
from surpassing this limitation. This financial problem has
the effect of limiting areawide capital improvements and ser-
vice functional expansions. Another problem in this area is
that the larger units of government (such as the state) cannot
justify a tax to meet the needs of a particular region.
Functional expansion is also inhibited by similar legal re-
strictions. Service extensions on the county level often
encounter opposition from municipal governments in addition
to the negative attitude of the county itself in attempting
to provide additional services. Municipal opposition is based
on the well-founded premise that in some cases, the munici-
pality is already providing the desired service to its own
residents, and any provision of this service by the county
would require its residents to pay twice.
--Administration and attitude: a general purpose government
may not want to assume additional functions or simply may be
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incapable of assuming additional responsibilities. The reluc-
tance to perform additional or expanded services is often a
result of intergovernmental antagonioms, the political desire
to keep tax rates low, or a desire to terminate the service
altogether. The administrative structure of a general unit
may not have matured sufficiently to handle additional capa-
city. Charges of inefficiency, mismanagement, and corrupt
political behavior are frequently raised in instances of a
service that demands professionalized performance.
--The desire for independence: generally the desire for inde-
pendence is a means of eliminating political decisionmaking
from the provision of a specific service. It also signifies
that a particular interest group feels that the function can be
10better observed and controlled when kept' small and simple.
This does not occur when a function is integrated among the many
services provided by a general-purpose government. Another
rationale for independence is that the function will not have
to compete with others for a share of the budget as in a general-
purpose government.
--Expediency and area condition: another defiency in general
government is the lack of speed with which it satisfies a need.
Local governments often dally on issues requiring a quick solu-
tion. Functional additions, expansions, and improvements are
a time consuming process in general-purpose governments. This
is demonstrated in the failure of many transit and school sys-
tems under municipal control.
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The history of special districts and- public authorities
The first authorities existed in England before the founding
of the United States. The authority form of government prospered
in sixteenth century England and began to attract the interest
of Parliament during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The first authorities in this country were the mining districts
in Colorado and California during the gold rushes. These were
formed because there was no other authority available to the
settlers and miners to arbitrate claims and disputes. The
first special district to be known by the label "authority"
was the Port of London, organized in 1909. The name "authority"
was christened by a newspaper editor "as a reaction against
the many 'authorities' granted to it by Parliament."'1 In this
country, many of the canals and turnpikes of the early nineteenth
century were built by government sponsored corporations.
However, the motivation for these government corporations was
on community development rather than on commercial success
which is the prime motivation for modern authorities. Yet they
were similar in that they were generally controlled by boards
of directors and financed their capital facilities by issuing
revenue bonds. Having characteristics similar to modern
authorities, these early corporations may be considered their
ancestors.
The first authority in this country that operated in a
manner similar to those in existence today was the Port of
New Orleans, organized in 1896. The first American authority
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to use the name "authority" was the Port of New York Authority
organized in 1921. It was the financial success of this par-
ticular institution that encouraged the formation of others.
The formation of public authorities and special districts
accelerated during the 1930's. In an effort to bring the
country out of the Depression, the Federal Government granted
funds to states for public works. Because the funding was on
a matching fifty-fifty local share basis, states and munici-
palities created authorities for the purpose of raising the
matching share. This they were compelled to-do since many state
and local governments had reached their debt limitations along
with the difficulty of obtaining credit, served-to impose a
severe restraint on their financial capacity. The public author-
ities could borrow outside of the constitutional debt limitation
by making use of revenue bonds. At this time, the states of
Pennsylvania, Alabama, and South Dakota passed enabling legis-
lation to allow municipalities to create authorities and special
districts.
In soil conservation alone, twenty-two states between
1935 and 1937 adopted the federally suggested enabling
acts out of which came hundreds of new districts....
It was federal expediency that fathered a multitude
of them [special districts] through grant programs
conditione 2on their being administered by special
districts.
Following the initial enabling legislation, 600 soil conservation
districts were formed between 1936 and 194 2. By July 1, 1964,
there were 2,928 soil conservation districts.1 3
The widespread use of revenue-bond financing, coupled
with the term, "authority," ... is attributable, in
great measure, to the inability of the conventional
governments to finance the services when their income
was cut drastically during the Depression by the
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the failure in tax collections on-real estate, on hich
most of the local governments had come to depend.
The advantages and disadvantages of special districts
Thus far, the terms "special districts," "public authorities,"
and "authorities," have been used interchangeably. There have
been several definitions for each of these terms:
Special districts constitute a specific class of separate
governmental units which possess- substantial fiscal and
administrative independence and are not merely parts of
other governments. Organizations that are adjuncts to!
governmental un 4s are identified as dependent districts
or authorities.
Authorities more frequently engage exclusively in revenue
producing enterprises financed solely by revenue bonds
and -service charges and.rges, with or- without support
from governmental grants.
The Pennsylvania Municipality Authorities Act of 1945 defines
an authority as "'a body corporate and politic' authorized to
'acquire, construct, improve, maintain and operate projects,
and to borrow money and issue bonds therefor." 7 For the
purposes of this thesis, the standard definition of a special
district and public authority coincide. Robert G. Smith lists
the characteristics of an authority or special district that
is used in this paper when he says that authorities should:1 8k
--function outside the regular structure of government
--finance and construct and usually operate revenue-producing
enterprises
-- have relative administrative autonomy
--be authorized to issue its own revenue bonds
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--and, not constitute debt with regular government debt limits
through the issuance of bonds
In Smith's standard definition of an authority he includes two
additional characteristics which will not be employed here:
--an authority is required to meet obligations of revenue bonds
from its own resources (i.e. user charges)
--and, authorities lack the power to levy taxes, but charge fees
to pay operational expenses.
The rationale for not including these two characteristics is
simply that they do not apply to all authorities and special
districts. Some, though not all, authorities do have the power
to levy taxes to cover both operating expenses and bond obliga-
tions. Therefore, the differences between authorities and
special districts for the intentions to be illustrated in this
thesis are insignificant; while at the same time, it must be
noted that there are small connotative distinctions in the
nomenclature.
The applicability of authorities as a solution to a recog-
nized urgent need has led to their overall acceptance. In
general, the many advantages offered by a public authority
is the prime determinant for their continued formation. One
of. the most important of these is that public authorities allow
action on a specific problem without going through the time
consuming, -representative government process. The special
district is preferred over other forms of metropolitan districts
(annexation, city-county consolidation, federation) because it
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is often easier to modify existing laws to permit the creation
of the special district. In many cases, a popular vote or
state legislation for establishing special districts present
far more liberal legal requirements than the techniques nec-
essary to establish other forms of metropolitan government.20
The revenue bond method allows public authorities to draw
capital from its own resources. Besides avoiding debt limita-
tions through the use of revenue bonds, the public authority
does not have to compete for a share of the budget of a general-
purpose government. This ability to finance itself along with
its non-political approach enables the authority to attract
high calibre personnel. This and the dependence on project
income leads to increased efficiency and professionalism. The
special district also gives to public ownership the elasticity,
continuity, and efficiency of private commercial management.
Another advantage lies in the fact that the authority is not
dependent on local tax sources; it does not have a fixed geo-
graphic jurisdiction. The possibility of direct assessment
of the costs for services to the users gives the authority
"an areawide potential for meeting specific functional needs."21
This "fluid boundary concept" allows the authority to extend
its jurisdiction to encompass both the area that needs service,
and the service's total sphere of influence. The authority
also does not have responsibility for other functions. This
advantage of having a concentrated interest results in a more
businesslike operation.
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George G. Sause of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Municipal
Affairs outlines several characteristics appropriate for
22
authority operation.
1. Public service is required and profit motivated enterprises
are undesireable.
2. The service is self-supporting.
3. Commercial type decisions are necessary.
4. The service is of a type that is easily understood by the
ordinary citizen.
5. The nature of the service causes authority personnel to
have frequent contacts with the general public.
Most public authorities and special districts have these attri-
butes. The first three characteristics designate the under-
lying rationale behind converting a private-run operation
(such as a public transit company) to public ownership by
means of special districts and public authorities. The last
two characteristics are the means of retainining public visi-
bility, and therefore, public control.
While there are many factors in favor of public authorities
and special districts, there are many who oppose authorities on
the grounds that they are detrimental to the public welfare.
The California Institute for Local Self-Government, which urges
the termination of the special district form of government, says
that unless we begin to carefully scrutinize them, "we run the
risk of even stronger central government, -- leading to the
ultimate denial of local self-government."2 3 The ILSG presents
this view from the fear that special districts are really ad-
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juncts of state and Federal governments, just another step
towards a more centralized government, depriving people of
local control. Authorities are felt by many to further frag-
mentize government affairs, causing "duplication, waste, uneco-
nomical limited-purpose operations, uncoordinated efforts,
greater complexity, and the decrease of citizen comprehension.
There are higher finance costs for special districts and author-
ities than there are for local governments because they must
operate within commercial credit institutions. Along with this,
there is the argument that authorities unduly disperse power
and control. Further arguments against authorities and special
districts as presented by the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations illustrate the potential dangers resulting
25,from vast concentrations of them:
(1) It is a piecemeal approach to metropolitan problems; the
practice of pulling out single functions for independent han-
dling -- even though on an areawide basis -- could, if carried
to its logical conclusion, lead to a whole "nest" of powerful
authorities, each operating with respect to a particular func-
tion and each unrelated in planning, programming, and financial
mangagement to all of the others.
(2) The creation of authorities adds to the number of local
units of government within the metropolitan area, of which
there are already too many.
(3) Authorities being typically governed by a board of directors
of private citizens for staggered terms, are not directly re-
sponsive to the will of the people and to a considerable ex-
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tent are beyond the reach of any one level of government.
The first point made by the Advisory Commission was fur-
ther expounded on by Britton Harris. His contention is that
typically, special districts and authorities do not promote
the amount of metropolitan coordination and cooperation that
their nature implies. 26 This is primarily a result of an
an authority's own special interest, itself. The example he
uses is in California, where cohesive, integrated planning is
nearly impossible because of the vast number of special dis-
tricts. In nearly every case, it was felt that "there was a
clearly expressed antipathy to the State" in its efforts to
encourage intergovernmental cooperation by special districts,
"but it was accompanied by the constantly recurring theme
that the State should take the initiative in developing metro-
politan planning activities."2 6
On the second point, it is felt that special districts
are adding to the total number of governments rather than
reducing them as was one of the original intents in their
creation. De Torres on this point found that below the state
level, "the average citizen is governed by a county, a muni-
cipality, a school district, and often by one or more special
districts. "27
But even with the potential dangers and problems, author-
ities and special districts have continued. Furthermore, they
have been approved by the general public. This is due largely
to the fact that authorities "have resolved the problems which
-18-
spawned them and have met the demands for public services in
an adequate fashion. 2 What more can be said for them consi-
dering the hardships many general-purpose governments have had
in providing services while burdened with politics, financial
deficits, mismanagement, misplaced priorities, and general
incompetence. This conflict between the advantages and disad-
vantages of special districts are best summarized by Robert G.
Smith's conclusion that "the most philosophical issues atten-
dant on the continued proliferation of public authorities have
been pushed to the side, especially in view of the fact that
the great attraction of the authority has been that it is an
expedient that quickly can be put into operation at any level
of government and can begin at once, to attack the imediate
problem at hand."2 9
Finally, some observations made by the Advisory Commission
will serve both to conclude this section and to illustrate the
30importance of special districts and authorities.
-- Over the past two decades, special districts have increased
by 93.6 percent, far surpassing the growth of any other unit
of local government.
-- Most special districts are still in non-metropolitan areas.
Yet one-third of all such jurisdictions have been located in
metropolitan areas since 1952. Special district proliferation
has been the most notable in the heavily urbanized states of
California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.
-- The rate of special district growth has caused the parental
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units of government to take measures to control such growth.
The Federal government has taken steps to insure that general
rather special purpose units will be the prime recipients of
grant money. (This topic will be explored in greater detail
in Chapter 5.)
-- Special districts exhibit a great deal of flexibility.
Their functional, structural, fiscal, and territorial flexi-
bilities insure that. such units may continue to play a promi-
nent role in most metropolitan government systems.
-- Transit districts are becoming increasingly prevalent on
the metropolitan scene.
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Chapter III
Transportation Authorities
As noted in the conclusion to the last chapter, the trans-
portation authority (especially the transit authority) is
gaining ever increasing popularity in urban areas. Trans-
portation is a function which can be easily adapted to and is
especially applicable to public authority operation. This is
because transportation and its related facilities is capital
intensive. While at the same time, it is a function that is
vital to the economic development of all metropolitan areas.
Transportation difficulties in an urban area often constitute
the most critical deficiency because of the necessity to move
people and materials. Therefore it should be considered a
public good.
Consequently, very few major urban areas have retained
their private transit companies. The five most populous
cities in this country have either formed municipal transit
authorities or have turned over their transit operations to
state-created regional transit authorities. In most of the
cases where transit operations were transferred, the author-
ity method was seen as a means of bolstering a dying, deficit-
ridden service. The reasons for which this was deemed possible
is the topic of the next section.
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Influential factors in the creation of transit authorities
Transportation authorities are superior to government-
operated transportation -facilities for several reasons. These
are: the broader geographical coverage provided, the opportunity
to deal with more than one form of transportation, and improved
financial capabilities. Each of these is due to some limi-
tation in the capability of general-purpose governments. In
practice however, they have not been universally realized.
The Indiana Institute for Urban Transportation comments
further on transit authority financial advantages:
Financing on the local level may be easier with the
transit authority than with other forms. Many states
impose a constitutional debt limitation on lower
governmental jurisdictions, and authorities are often
created to circumvent these limitations. Many author-
ities are given the power to issue revenue bonds,
which normally do not fall under the debt limitations
imposed upgn the municipality in which the authority
functions.
Finances have been the most crucial issue in transit operation.
Faced with declining patronage, antiquated equipment, and
rising costs, most transit operations have either gone bank-
rupt or are running huge deficits. Incidently, public authority
operation does not guarantee financial profit:
Transit has been traditionally a deficit operation
in this country. The Rhode Island Public Transit
Authority has stood almost alone as a public trans-
portation system that itself produces enough revenue
to avoid the need for subsidization, but eveg it is
now in danger of losing that favored status.
The most potent weapon the transit authority has to combat
this trend is the revenue bond. The use of bonding power by
-23-
public authorities is based on the concept that people are
willing to invest in a project and believe that the project
will generate sufficient revenues in return to amortize the
bonds and pay interest on them.4 Another advantage is that
the transit authority has greater flexibility as to the fixing
of user charges than does a general-purpose government. With
these financial advantages the authority is able to construct
capital facilities without earmarking taxes, thus freeing
local government from both supporting a specific service and
avoiding tax increases through the employment of user charges.
Finances also designate the conditions for publicly owned tran-
sit. Publicly owned transit should be established "(1) when
there are many external benefits and costs that do not find
their way into the farebox as revenue or onto the income state-
ment as an outlay, (2) when the service is inherently monopo-
listic, and (3) when public costs of operation are not much
different from those of private firms."5
Another factor in the creation of transit authorities is
the desire for independence. Transportation has customarily
taken a "back seat" in relation to the multitude of critical
problems confronting general-purpose governments. (This is
best illustrated by the relatively recent creation of the
Federal Department of Transportation.) Even in the field of
transportation, public transit has been typically of secondary
concern in relation to other modes such as highways, airports,
and waterways. (This is further demonstrated by the fact that
many state transportation departments carry the suffix,
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"Highway Department.") Consequently, transit has usually
been the loser in the competition for a sufficient share of
both state and municipal budgets. Or. this subject, the Insti-
tute for Urban Transportation contends that "the authority
provides a vital and independent means of administering what
is essentially a commercial -- although not necessarily a
profit-making -- enterprise. The service provided by the
authority generates revenues that can- be used to offset expenses,
and the relative independence of an authority enables it to
function in a more businesslike manner than the city transit
department, which is typically more politically oriented."6
An additional point is that by isolating the public transit
function, it is hoped that the concentration of interVest will
aid in the development of a more balanced transportation sys-
tem.
A third attraction in favor of transit authorities is
that they can be made regional, to cover the entire effective
area. As urban areas developed, new political subdivisions
were formed rather than extending the boundaries of existing
political units. Public transit is one of the many public
services that can be administered efficiently only if a large
service area is covered. "Political boundaries and the boun-
daries of this ideal service area seldom coincide." This,
as a result, leads to several privately- or publicly-owned
transit companies within the same metropolitan area. Often,
there is both duplication of service and waste resulting from
the unnecessary administrative costs of the several organiza-
tions. Another issue is that equipment and facilities are not
adequately coordinated. Schedules, routes, and faires are also
uncoordinated, often causing much consternation among the public
that is served. "Transit authorities are often able to overcome
the problems of the multiplicity of complex political units
that comprise most metropolitan areas, even those of modest
size. This virtue is particularly true of the transit authority
as opposed to the city department, since transit needs and ser-
vices cannot be hampered by the artificial political boundaries
of the city, but should serve the whole of the urbanized area."9
The cohesiveness of providing efficient transportation services
can be brought about by a "transportation" authority that owns
and operates more than one mode of transportation (i.e. parking,
bridges, tunnels, toll roads, etc.). This would eliminate the
inefficient competition between modes for the patronage of the
public and more economically balance the use of the various.
modes in terms of costs.
The efficiency and expediency of operation has been a
success with transit authorities. The absence of political
overtones avoids the delays attributed to obtaining public
approval when there is an urgent need for action. The regional
outlook of a metropolitan transit authority allows for the use
of economies of scale in many phases of operation. This is
especially applicable in eliminating duplication, maximizing
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revenues, and providing the desired service adequately.
Still another advantage is that the application of business
principles and corporate administration is an intrinsic charac-
teristic of the transit authority. For one thing, due to the
corporate structure, personnel of professional calibre can be
attracted, bypassing the civil service requirements of a muni-
cipal agency. The fact that management personnel do not (gener-
ally) have to face re-election leads to greater continuity of
action and more professional "know-how." There is also a greater
incentive for a successful operation because the authorityrs
revenue bonds must be marketable. This bondholder scrutiny
along with the premise that an authority is a "better organi-
zation for commercial type decisions" and the better personnel
administration leads to the rationale behind the claim to supe-
rior efficiency in authority operations. 1 Another managerial
reason similar to the non-political argument is the claim that
"the efficiency of public services is increased if the entre-
preneurial functions are made the responsibility of a group
which is not already burdened with the responsibility for the
government function."11 The corporate nature of authority
operation transforms the public service into a business and
it.consequently becomes a profit-motivated, revenue-producing
enterprise.
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The transit authority - structure and power
Transit authorities differ from one another in several
respects. It is probably true that no two transit authorities
follow the same- basic model. This is because each metropolitan
region is unique unto itself. These differences are due to many
factors: size, population, history of the area, political
structure, previous transit experiences, etc. No two metropo-
litan areas are the same, therefore no two transit authorities
can be the same, since it is the character of the region that
determines what form the transit authority is to take. Yet,
there are several parallels among- transit authorities that
give them their separate distinction, but even these appear
similar only on the surface. A closer look would divulge the
differences among the similarities.
Nearly all transit authorities (and special districts)
are made possible by state legislation authorizing their for-
mation. "The creation of special districts is usually based
on state enabling legislation that can be utilized anywhere
in the state ... in these enabling laws, the state legislature
decides upon the major governmental characteristics of the
districts, such as area, function, organization, and financial
authority." 12 However, for transit authorities, the state
enabling legislation usually only pertains to one particular
authority, rather than setting a standard for the creation of
transit authorities statewide. (Both California and Massachu-
setts have been innovators in this area. There are several
transit authorities in California; and in Massachusetts,
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transit authorities in Worcester, Greenfield, and New Bedford
are- in the process of formation.) Close in hand with this is
the question of whether cr not the transit authority is formed
incrementally or if there were previous transit authority ex-
periences. This point greatly affects the nature of the re-
sulting authority. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) is one formed by the incremental approach.
It has evolved from the privately-owned Boston Elevated Railway
to the publicly owned Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)
encompassing fourteen cities and towns. The MTA was the nation's
first transportation authority, but its success was stunted as
it became known as "a dumping ground for political hacks." 13
In an attempt to remove the political patronage associated with
the MTA, the present MBTA was formed in 1964, having a region
covering 79 cities and towns in eastern Massachusetts. It is
still beset by political involvement and is a constant issue
in the State Legislature. One the other hand, the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) is on the road to success
because it was formed with no previous attempts, and has avoided
the politics of the area. MARTA has wide latitude as to its
functions and plans, whereas the MBTA is severly restricted in
many areas because of previous experiences.
Another issue is just how much autonomy there is from the
parent government. In an analysis made in 1957, it was deter-
mined that of 14,405 special district government examined,
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3180 were in designated metropolitan areas, and only 69 of the
14,405 were both independent and metropolitan.1 4 The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations outlines some of the
characteristics common to dependent authorities:15
- appointment of agency officers by the chief executive and/or
governing body of the parent government or control of the
agency gy a board composed wholly or mainly of parent govern-
ment officials
- control by the agency over facilities that supplement, serve,
or take the place of facilities ordinarily provided by the
creating government after the agency's debt has been repaid
- required approval of agency plans by the creating government
- and, legislative or executive specification by the parent
government as to the location and-type of facilities that
the agency is to construct-and maintain
The extent of dependence of an authority can at times inhibit
the advantages an authority would otherwise have because of
its independence. The main advantage of the authority is that
it can operate in a corporate manner, but one whose operations
are controlled to any extent by the parent government is in
reality just another city or state bureau.
- The interactions between local governments and the transit
anthority is another aspect that differs from city to city.
One possible cause for the awkwardness between transit author-
ities and local governments is the fact that the transit author-
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ity does not place much emphasis on direct taxation for finan-
16
cing. (There are exceptions to this, e.g. the Bay Area Rapid
Transit District.) This gives the authority and the general-
purpose government different perspectives in relation to
present actions and future planning. The transit authority can
act immediately on any needed project; whereas, the general-
purpose government must base all actions on a capital budget,
spreading improvements over a period of several years. There-
fore, a working relationship between the two is not on an equal
basis. Also, transit authorities are often overly protective
of their autonomy: "San Francisco's efficient regional transit
agency is narrowly self-protective and has a history of diffi-
culties in its local working relationships."1 7 Problems of
this type are also contrary to one of the original intents of
transit authorities -- that of developing coordinated trans-
portation planning. In situations such as this, the growth
and effectiveness of the transit authority is paralyzed:
"While Southeastern Michigan's experience with authorities
is relatively limited, it appears that authorities have been
unable to develop when faced with strong opposition or compe-
tition from existing organizations." 18  Even now, the South-
eastern Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA) has been
thwarted in its attempts to acquire the Department of Street
Railways from the city of Detroit, the only remaining transit
company in SEMTA's jurisdiction not under its control. (More
will be said on SEMTA in Chapter IV.)
Administrative control of a transit authority is closely
interrelated to the degrce of autonomy an authority holds.
Smith points out the areas in which control of an authority is
determined:1 9
(1) the statutory length of existence of the authority
(2) the callability of the authority's bonds
(3) the method of selection of the board
(4) the length of the term of board members and its con-
formity, or lack of conformity, to that of the appointing
power
(5) the method of selecting the chairman and the executive
director
(6) the method of removing members of the board and the
chairman
(7) the control of the board over its capital budget
(8) the control of the board over its expense budget
(9) the approval, it any, of authority projects by the
parent government
(10) and, the control of the board over its pricing
policies (for determining user charges).
Essentially, special districts with appointed board members
can be independent if they form their own budgets, financing
programs, policies, and make their own administrative decisions.2 0
Smith feels that appointment of board members is one of the
major determinants of' a dependent authority. District governing
bodies with ex officio members are not independent. This gives
control of the authority board to whatever consensus of local
units prevailing at a particular time. But as long as board
members are not subject to significant control by the appointing
authority, and the other independent conditions predominate,
the authority will be independent.2 1
Another characteristic that varies from authority to au-
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thority is the subject of finances. All authorities (as consi-
dered and defined in this thesis) have the power to issue
revenue bonds; but generally, an authority has one or more
additional means of raising revenues. The more prominent
methods of raising these revenues include subsidies, taxes, and
facility user charges. It is at this point that one of the
minute differences between authorities and special districts
emerges. Traditionally, the "special district" has had limited
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taxing powers, whereas the "authority" has not. 2 Now however,
many authorities are given taxing powers, or are made the prime
beneficiaries of taxes earmarked for their particular service.
Examples of this are: the one-cent sales tax in Atlanta for
the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)$ the
one-half cent cigarette tax in the Boston area (MBTA), and the
one-half cent gasoline tax for the Southeastern Michigan Trans-
portation Authority (SEMTA). Rarely will an authority be
given a property tax, as this method of raising revenues is
usually reserved for general-purpose governments and school
districts. Yet the notion of earmarking funds derived from
sales or excise taxes is not uncommon.
Because of the continuing deficits facing public trans-
protation, many transit authorities receive some form of go-
vernment subsidy. The method of subsidization is further
divided into its two most prevalent forms: direct government
subsidies and assessments. (Assessments are funds received
from units of local government pre-formulated according to
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various demographic factors, user head counts, representation,
etc.; usually to recover an operating deficit in the case of
transit authorities.) The amount of subsidy and assessment
has typically become a political issue where this method of
financing is used. With transit authorities in particular,
decreasing the amount of governmental support was one of the
arguments for the creation of the authority. But, as many
transit authorities have come to rely heavily on subsidization
and assessments, they have also come to lose a large degree of
their autonomy. In most cases, subsidies and assessments are
merely substitutions for the power of taxation. 2 3
Normally, the transit authority draws the bulk of its
income from the sale of revenue bonds and the imposition of
facility user charges. It is the ability to make these two
sources of income a success that determines whether or not
the authority itself is a success. This is both the principal
difference and a primary advantage that the authority has over
general-purpose governments.
The authority arises, generally, in response to an
unfilled need for capital construction. The agency's
priciple advantage for hard-pressed governments lies
in its ability to resort to the flotation of revenue
bonds which are to be supported primarily from fees
to charged for the ug4 of the facility built by
this borrowed money.
Coincidently, herein also lies the prime determinant of an
authority's independence from other levels of government.
It is only when an authority can successfully market bonds
and draw income from their capital facilities that the authority
becomes a true corporation. In the case of transit authorities,
this is becoming an increasingly difficult proposition. Fiscal
autonomy for authorities "must rest on an authority's ability
to handle profitable ventures, as the bond market will not,
for any period of time, sustain deficit financing." This is
a significant problem for transit authorities in the major
urban areas in this country. Generally, special district and
public authority revenue bonds- became very marketable one the
public was shown the profitability in them. This was largely
due to the success of the Port of New York Authority. However,
transit authorities have not had the financial successes of
port and turnpike authorities; and, this is bound to eventually
have an effect on the sale of their bonds. Many transit author-
ities have a legislatively imposed debt limitation or restric-
tion. This may have the form of either an absolute debt limit
(as is the case for municipalities), or the approval of the
governor or some agency is required on projects surpassing some
preset monetary limit. This deprives the authority of both
one of its freedoms and one of its advantages. Another issue
in finances is that of user charges. Some transit authorities
do not have exclusive control over the rates they charge;
instead they are regulated by some public utility commission.
Still another factor is that some transit authorities do not
have control over the user charges .of other modes (bridges,
toll roads, etc.), and must actually compete against these
other modes for patronage. Both of these factors can have a
detrimental effect on the success and the service provided by
transit authorities.
Evaluation Criteria
This section is devoted to the various factors to be used
in evaluating the cases. These same criteria can be applied to
any special district or public authority, rather than to just
transit authorities as is done here. There are many factors
which determine the "success" of a transit authority, but
these have been chosen as the more important and significant.
1. Effective performance of the service involved.
This relates to the amount and visibility of the services
provided by the transit authority. Often, in an attempt to
economize and make the entire operation profitable, the transit
company will attempt many cutbacks in service. This is what
should not occur. Rather, a transit authority's objective
should be to provide increased services and make their services
known to the public. The servic aspect also includes actions
such as Seattle's free downtown bus service, .and the reduced
fare programs in Boston and New York during off-peak hours.
Proposals and programs such as these aid in advertising the
services available, attract increased ridership which in turn
leads to increased revenues. Besides this, future plans must
be initiated to expand services and a concerted effort towards
their achievement are additional, though long-term, methods
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toward effective performance of the service. This is indeed
the most important criterion by which transit authorities
should be measured along with the following criterion.
2. Economy in providing the service.
The measurement of an authority's financial success and
effectiveness receives equal consideration with that of pro-
viding service. This is also a point which opponents of the
public authority concept debate. Their argument is basically
that "the use of special districts tends to increase local
government costs -- they are likely to involve at least some
duplication of administrative overhead and to promote excessive
use of revenue bond financing, with higher interest costs than
might otherwise have been involved."2 6 However, this externa-
lity must be accepted if the transit authority or any other
special district is to operate in a corporate manner. But,
aside from the increased administrative and capital costs
(though they are small), the real issue is the costs of ser-
vice. A true authority operating financially on revenue bonds
and user charges would, as a goal, minimize the costs of ser-
vice. And with the rising public transit deficits, the econo-
mies realized by the transit authority would be the determinant
of its longevity, as the residents within the transit authority's
district will eventually withdraw their support. So just in
the matter of survival, the costs of service will be the most
crucial consideration.
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3. Political responsiveness.
Typically, this has been a somewhat dormant issue, but it
is one that can quickly awaken. The basic reason for the unim-
portance of political responsiveness has been the emphasis lon
getting the job done rather than on any preconceived allocation
of political responsibility."27  However, transit authorities
(or any public authority) should be responsible and responsive
to their constituency. Smith notes that authorities have sev-
eral constituencies: the special public that invests in the
bonds of the authority, the patrons who use the facilities and
reimburse a portion of their cost through user charges, and
the parent governments who first established them.28 Other
points of dissent against public authorities evolve from pos-
sible disenfranchisement,
Opposition can arise because of their lack of cooper-
ation with general-purpose governments, their remote-
ness from local citizenry, and their erosion of minor-
ity political power .... Areawide districts are ...
often opposed by minority groups in the central city
Rarely do blacks exert any real influence over
special districts or other regional structures.
Consequently, in the future, regional special districts
with heavy suburban representation may dilute the 29
political power of the black central city populace.
As a rule, constituents do not have any significant control
over an authority's operation. (Only in some instances is
voter approval required for an authority to issue revenue,
bonds.) Fares, routes, schedules, etc., are usually all
within the complete control of the transit authority. Only
in those boards where members are directly elected does the
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constituent have a voice in authority operations. Authority
board members are the key to constituent control. There are
several ways in which boards members are selected, some giving
indirect representation, and others implying little or no repre-
30
sentation at all:
- direct election
- representation of constituent units (local appointment,
ex officio)
- mixed local systems: direct election and constituent
unit representation
- mixed state and local appointment
- local nomination followed by state appointment
- gubernatorial appointment
- judicial appointment
- nomination by economic interests followed by state
appointment
Arthur Bromage supports constituent unit representation for
limited purpose authorities because it spares voters the ambi-
guity of multiple elections while offering indirect political
accountability. Typically, transportation authority boards are
either state appointed, locally appointed, or both. Still
another issue is that of which groups are to be represented.
The Indiana Institute for Urban Transportation suggests that
governing boards be composed of the local news media, local
retailers, legal expertise, ethnic and minority members, sec-
tions of the metropolitan area, financial expertise, planning.-
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expertise, a woman representative, businessmen, a senior citi-
zen representative, and a youth representative.31 It is felt
that these representives cover all fcreseeable interest groups
with whom a transit authority would concern itself. However,
this representation scheme is rarely accomplished, with any
special district or public authority. Consequently, this cri-
terion can only be measured by observing a transit authority's
reactions to constituent demands.
4. Perpetuation of existing governmental structure and frag-
mentation.
On this topic, the opinions of several experts in the
fields of transportation and special district government have
illustrated the potential disadvantages of transit auathorities
and special districts in general. Wilfred Owen writes,
.. the query naturally arises whether further pro-
liferation of transport agencies is not defeating
the objective of achieving improved transportation
for the metropolitan area. Carving out more pieces
of the problem for separate treatment aggravates one32
of the basic difficulties that needs to be overcome.
The ad hoc authority operating within a special dis-
trict which is larger than the municipality attempts
to solve the technical, administrative, and financial"
problems arising in connection with a particular ser-
vice but isolating it from the complex of municipal
services of which it forms a part. It may solve the
problem, but only at the cost of weakening the general
structure of local government in the great city and
its environs, whereas the real need is to strengthen
it. Unless authorities are properly conceived, then
they may perpetuate the piecemeal approach to trans-
portation in the metropolitan area. "The end objec-
tive is a unified government for an entire area to
the greatest degree that such unification is politi-
cally desireable and economically feasible. Freezing
a single function or activity into an autho ty may
prevent the unification of all government."
Robert Smith notes that for additional borrowing capacity,
local governments have sacrificed "much of the control over
their planning process," and that the continuance of the public
authority "has tended to fragment the complementary roles of
general-purpose governments, including planning. 34 The Advi-
sory Commission. on -Intergovernmental Relations bases its comments
on the loss of local government effectiveness:
The limited purpose special district tends to erode
the importance of general-purpose governments --
usually cities -- and to the extent that this dimin-
ishes their capacity to elicit the support, interest,
and respect of the itizenry, and therefore their
ability to govern.
Limited purpose metropolitan special districts have
been useful in dealing with urgent special problems
of a metropolitan character in the face of the fail-
ure of the traditional comprehensive approaches to
provide feasible alternatives. Yet they have attri-
butes which seriously undermine vigorous local go-
vernment: they diffuse and weaken citizen interest
and control, and erode the strex gth and importance
of general-purpose governments.
These interpretations speak well for the possible detriments
a transit authority may have on its jurisdiction, but there
is another side to the argument. Many timea a special district
is formed because there is no other way existing governmental
units will allow a problem to be solved. Bollens says that at
times, it is "preferred to milder types of integration, such
as intergovernmental contracts. Here suspicion of one unit
by another is revealed, for there is competition as well as
cooperation between governments .... Officials are more willing
to establish a new governmental unit, a metropolitan district,
than they are to transfer a function to an existing government."37
-40-0
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This indicates that there is some congregation from many to
one in certain cases. This is very definitely a consideration
to be examined when creating transit authorities.
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Chapter IV
Case Studies
The case studies described in this chapter are relatively
new ventures in mass transit development. Each was established
for the expressed purpose of organizing an effective public
transit system. Along with this was the mandate to construct
and operate a regional rapid transit system within their juris-
dictions. Each was created by an action of their respective
state legislatures to improve upon city-owned public transit
systems and was given the responsibility for the entire metro-
politan region. The transit authorities to be examined are:
the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD - Los
Angeles metropolitan area), the Southeastern Michigan Trans-
portation Authority (SEMTA - Detroit metropolitan area), and
the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD - San Francisco-
Oakland metropolitan area). Each of the transit authorities
are at various stages of implementing their rapid transit plans,
with only the Bay Area system nearly completed. Nevertheless,
it can safely be said that each authority is using every
resource available to give its constituency the public transit
system desired.
Southern California Rapid Transit Di.strict
The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD)
has a history that is not its own. The succession of transit
companies and public transit authorities form the real back-
ground of SCRTD. The first transit in Los Angeles began with
the horse cars in the 1870's, followed by cable car routes
and electric trolleys in 1895. By the turn of the century,
the several dozen street car companies were gradually purchased
and formed into the Pacific Electric Railway Company and the
Los Angeles Railway Company. By the end of World War I, these
two companies had already begun to experience the troubles
with public transit that were to develop later in the major
eastern cities. "In these cities, dense urban development had
occurred either before or in conjunction with the development
of rail transit lines. In Los Angeles, most of the metropo-
litan area developed after the advent of the automobile when
the major sections of rail systems had already been abandoned."
In 1925, a group of engineers recommended a $323 million, 298
mile, long-range rapid transit system for the Los Angeles
metropolitan as it was about this time that automobile usage
began to hamper the existing mass transit system. In 1945, the
Los Angeles Transit Lines acquired the Los Angeles Railway
Company; and in 1953, Metropolitan Coach Lines acquired the
Pacific Electric passenger operations. These two transfers
resulted in a reduction of service and the complete abandonment
of service on some lines. In the meantime, the California
State Legislature, in 1951, created the Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority (MTA) for the purpose of studying the feasi-
bility of a monorail line from Long Beach to the San Fernando
Valley. After it was determined that the monorail line was
not financially feasible, the legislature conferred additional
powers upon the MTA, in 1957, to acquire and operate surface
transit systems in addition to rapid transit. This authority
was limited by the restriction that.farebox revenues were the
only basis for financing both capital improvements and opera-
tions. After the major rapid transit corridors were deter-
mined, the legislature created the Southern California Rapid
Transit District in 1964. The SCRTD was given the authority
to submit a bond issue to the voters, the most significant new
power granted to the District. In 1968, the SCRTD issued a
final report recommending an initial 89-mile, five corridor
rail-bus system for metropolitan Los Angeles.
The goals of SCRTD are taken directly from its mandate to
operate bus service in Los Angeles County and to develop, con-
struct and operate a rapid transit system within the District.
The two highest priorities which were set forth in the report
Rapid Transit for Los Angeles are:
1. Initial construction as soon as possible of 116
- miles of mass rapid transit facilities and 24 miles
of exclusive-lane busways to serve eight of the most
heavily congested travel corridors in the Basin.
Additional increments of the 250-mile system will
be designed during the construction of the initial
program, to prepare for further stages of develop-
ment of the system.
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2. An area-wide expansion of the bus service and bus
equipment should begin immediately, designed in the
near term to provide improved service to passengers
on existing and new bus lines. Included in this
program will be additional park-and-ride facilities,
express bus service on freeway and exclusive bus lanes
in arterial streets. Ultimately, the bus system will
also become an efficient fegder and distribution sys-
tem for mass rapid transit.
Consultants project that about 70% of all Los Angeles County
residents will live or work within a ten minute ride of one
of the initial rapid transit corridors. By 1990 an estimated
one million trips will be made daily on the rapid transit
system.3 Of these, 706,000 will be people who would otherwise
use automobiles. As a result, vehicular congestion on free-
ways and arterial streets will be significantly decreased in
the Los Angeles area. The percentage of work trips made via
transit will rise from the present 38 percent to 65 percent,
with about 75 percent of these riders using the system from
7 to 9 a.m. and from 4 to 6 p.m. The rapid transit system,
when .finally completed, will directly connect the Los Angeles
central business district with Long Beach, Torrance, Santa
Monica, the San Fernando Valley, Pasadena, and Anaheim.
Additional impacts will be travel time savings, reduced
accidents, dollar savings in auto operation, increased pro-
perty values, improved accessibility to activity centers,
reduced air pollution, and reduced energy consumption.
From its creation to May 1973, the SCRTD has made 81 ser-
vice improvements on the existing bus system. These have
included new routes, extended service on other routes, express
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"Super Flyer" service, "owl" service on several routes, and
reduced headways.5 The only actions that might be regarded
as service cutbacks have been reroutings to provide service
to more isolated areas, therefore they were not,really service
cutbacks. There have not otherwise been any service reductions.
From the perspective of economy, Los Angeles has been one
of the few cities in the country where the zone-fare system is
universal. This system does not penalize the short distance
rider by asking him to help defray the coats of long-distance
riders, as is the case in cities with one standard fare.
Further, the projected cost of the initial 140-mile rapid
transit system is expected to be $3,363,000,000 in 1973 dollars,
$6,642,000,000 including contingencies and inflation over the
twelve year construction period. However, each resident in
Los Angeles County will pay only about $30.00 annually to sup-
port of the Bay Area transit properties. To finance the pro-
ject, consultants have recommended a new 3/4-cent general sales
tax within the District. These funds would be supplemented by
an issue of special tax bonds to be retired from the sales tax
revenues one construction is completed.6 A county-wide vote
on this proposal will be held in June or November of 1974.
If, approved, construction of the rapid transit system will
begin in 1975. A deficit operation is anticipated for the
completed system amounting to $237,820,000 (1987 dollars).7
SCRTD's policy is that transit is a public service and there-
8fore does not intend to make any service cutbacks. The deficit
is expected to be recovered from local sources, a state public
transportation fund, and the state gasoline tax. But these
funds are not guaranteed, so the SCRTD is anticipAting addi-
tional funding sources.
The District's Board of Directors consists of eleven
members:
1. A five member Board of Supervisors appointed by the
Governor.
2. Two members appointed by the Mayor of Los Angeles with
the concurrence of the Los Angeles City Council.
3. Four members appointed by- the City Selection Committee:
each of the 77 cities within the District has one elected
representative to the Committee; the District is then di-
vided into four quadrants and each quadrant elects one
Director to the Board; each city's vote is in proportion
to its assessed evaluation.9
This mixed state/local appointment system is one of the better
-representation schemes among authorities. It gives the District
a state perspective along with local control. However, the
Board of Directors is lacking in that particular interest groups
are not necessarily represented. Nonetheless, this does give
residents a form of constituent unit representation and indi-
rect political accountability which is considered suitable for
large metropolitan authorities. 10
Governmental cooperation in Southern California has been
fairly strong. This has been achieved through a regional body,
the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG).
SCRTD tra'nsit planning has been undertaken as an element of
the unified transportation planning program. of SCA G, together
with the City of Los Angeles, the County .of Los Angeles, and
the California Department of Transportation. Findings, results,
reports, and recommendations relating to transit are all com-
posed as a joint effort of this group. Consequently, there
has been no friction between SCRTD and local general-purpose
governments. Additional reasons for this is the combined fact
that the City of Los Angeles approximates an urban county in
operation without carrying that designation, and that SCRTD
requires voter approval for all major actions (e.g. 60% voter
approval for bond issues, and voter approval for the additional
sales tax). Instead, the SCRTD has been hampered by the lack
of commitment of its constituency as they have repeatedly
rejected the funding of the rapid transit system. Another
point is that public transit has never been a municipal func-
tion, therefore no fragmentation of government or responsibility
has occurred. Rather, the formation of the MTA, to be succeeded
by the SCRTD, has given indirect popular control of public
transit to the residents of metropolitan Los Angeles. Based
on this, the Southern California Rapid Transit District has
been a success as a transit authority.
Southern Michigan Transportation Authority -
The Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA)
was given multi-modal responsibilities upon its creation in
1967. This is unique among transit authorities. The Metro-
politan Transportation Authorities Act of 1967 passed by the
Michigan State Legislature gave SEMTA responsibility for all
public transportation facilities as delineated by Section le:
"Public transportation facility" means all property,
real and personal, useful for the transportation of
passengers for hire, including but not limited to
street railways, motor bus, tramlines, subways, mono-
rail, rail rapid transit, tunnel, bridge, and parking
facilities use in connection with the operation of
the authority.
The 1967 Act also gave SEMTA "the right to use space and areas
over, under and. upon the public streets and highways to carry
,12
out its duties subject to reasonable use." This gave the
six county SEMTA jurisdiction- of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb,
Monroe, St. Clair, and Washtenaw the most nearly multi-modal
transportation authority in the country. However, this strength
of SEMTA has been encumbered by the repeated defiance of its
various constituencies. Yet SEMTA has survived numerous set-
backs, including near bankruptcy and dissolution, to carry out
its purpose of providing a comprehensive, coordinated system
of public transportation for the six-county region.
The most unusual feature of SEMTA is its close integration
with the Southeastern Michigan Council- of Governments (SEMCOG).
SEMCOG, the areawide planning body, is a voluntary association
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of local governmental agencies including countries, cities,
villages, school districts, and special purpose districts.
It is responsible for the regional plan and the on-going con-
tinuing planning process. The Bureau of the Budget of the
Executive Office of the President has certified SEMCOG as the
official metropolitan A-95 clearinghouse. SEMTA's enabling
legislation provides that six of the nine SEMTA Board members
be appointed by SEMCOG and the remaining three by the Governor.
The Authority holds a seat on the Council's Executive committee
and must submit its plans and programs to SEMCOG for review
and comment. These ties between the two organizations has
been to the general benefit of the region. This relationship
is also significant because SEMCOG will likely be the executive
organization for a future Detroit metropolitan government.
Since SEMCOG's Board consists of a local elected official from
each county, community, and district, the constituency of SEMTA
is given indirect representation on SEMTA's Board of Directors.
Another unique feature of this relationship is that the juris-
dictions of both SEMTA and SEMCOG coincide. This enables
truly comprehensive and coordinated regional planning to be
developed for metropolitan Detroit. The Authority also main-
tains ties with city and county planning commissions and agencies,
including the Inter-County Highway Commission. Consequently,
SEMTA has been a factor towards the promotion of a unified
planning approach and has been politically responsive to the
desires of its constituents in terms of costs and service.
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Yet, it was previously mentioned that there have been
conflicts between SEMTA and local governments. The source of
this conflict has been the region's typical isolationist atti-
tudes. Incidents of assessment withholdings by the counties
outside of the core Wayne County have prompted the counties
to consider establishing their own regional agencies. It is
felt that the southern "urban" counties of Wayne, Monroe, and
Washtenaw are profiting through SEMTA at the expense of the
"rual 13
northern "rural" counties. But there is also opposition
among the urban counties due to the disagreements over the
region's largest transit company, the Department of Street
Railways (DSR), owned by the City of Detroit. Detroiters
are prompted by the justifiable concern that there will be
some loss of service if the DSR is purchased by SEMTA. However,
the Authority's record has indicated that it has improved ser-
vice and reduced fares, and nowhere has the opposite occurred.
In fact, the perseverance of the city in running its own service
has resulted in duplicated transit lines and pressure for in-
creased fares on DSR lines. Only recently has the groundwork
been laid for the eventual purchase of the DSR by SEMTA through
leasing arrangements between the two.14 In addition, these
"trial mergers" have allowed the transfer of $2 million in
state funds, through SEMTA, to aid the deficit-ridden DSR.
Although SEMTA only owns one of the six transit companies
in its district, it has made possible numerous service improve-
ments through the purchase of operating rights. These include
fare reductions during off-peak hours, heated bus shelters,
reduced headways, an urban-suburban transfer system, new mo-
dernized buses, and additional bus routes. The most signifi-
cant 'service improvement has been the conversion from standard
to zone fares. Previously, riders travelling one mile paid the
same fare as those travelling fifteen miles.
SEMTA's ability to reduce service costs has been prevented
by its frustration in acquiring complete ownership of the re-
gion's public transit lines. Until SEMTA has the authority to
coordinate routes and eliminate duplications of service, (SEMTA
is presently restricted from making any changes in routes and
schedules.15 ) the region cannot realize the many economies
possible in the district. State efforts to provide public
transit with financial assistance has resulted in a two-cent
per gallon gasoline tax increase, of which 1/2-cent per gallon
is designated for public transportation. From this fund,
SEMTA will receive approximately $8.5 million a year to cover
deficits and part of the local share for Federal capital im-
provement funds. The Authority is empowered to issue revenue
bonds for capital construction to be amortized from revenues,
assessments, special taxes, etc. As yer there has been no
financial plan approved to raise capital for the region's
future rapid transit system.
In 1972, the Citizens Advisory Council (CAC) to SETA
was formed. The 60-member CAC has formed four committe 3, as
requested by SEMTA, to assist in improving and developing fu-
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ture action programs for the Authority:16
1. an educational committee dedicated to educating the general
public to use and accept public transportation
2. a committee concerned with transportation to employment areas
3. a committee addressing itself to the problems of the transit
dependent such as the youngold, handicapped, and those who
cannot afford to drive cars
4. an environmental impact committee
As a metropolitan coalition of public transit supporters, the
CAC hopes to have a "marked effect" on SE4TA's future work.1 7
This organization along with the indirect political represen-
tation through SEMCOG should also be an effective control in
insuring that SEMTA carries out its basic goals:
1. The acquisition, consolidation and unification of
-the existing bus carriers in the six-county region,
to assure the continued existence and subsequent im-
provements of public transportation facilities and
service.
2. The examination of existing commuter rail operations
to develop feasible service improvements, and
3. The development of a regional rapid transit network
to supplementlgransportation available both privately
and publicly.
Overall, the most important and relevant distinction of
SEMTA is its relation to SEMCOG. This is the first attempt
"to encompass within the representation of public authorities
the newer areawide cooperatives of government, which, them-
selves, have drawn together the constituents of local govern-
ment."1 9 In southeastern Michigan, therefore, a method has
been found to encourage intergovernmental cooperation and
coordinated transportation planning without a radical change
in governmental structure.
Bay Area Rapid Transit District
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD) has been one
of the more successful transit authorities. The basis for this
statement is its new mass rapid transit system, the first in
this country in more than fifty years. Once the complete
system is in full operation this fall, it will be the world's
most modern, technologically advanced in the world.
The original idea that was to lead to BARTD's creation
was a 1947 Army-Navy review board suggestion for a trans-bay,
sub-aqueous tube to link the cities of San Francisco and
Oakland. Electric trains in the tube was determined as the
best means of transporting people between the two cities. In
1949, the California State Legislature -passed enabling legis-
lation for the creation of a rapid transit district in the
Bay area. But the District was not formed at this time. In
1951, the enabling act was amended establishing the San Fran-
cisco Area Rapid Transit Commission to develop a master plan
for mass transportation throughout the region. By 1957, the
Commission issued its final report recommending the creation
of BARTD to include the counties of San Francisco, Alameda,
Contra Costa, San Mateo, and Marin. Consequently, legislation
establishing BARTD was passed by the State Legislature, and
the District was given property taxing authority to carry out
the subsequent financial and engineering studies. During the
next few years, BARTD was permitted to use Bay Bridge tolls to
finance the trans-bay tube, a tentative rapid transit plan was
submitted to city-and county officials, and BARTD's use of the
Golden Gate Bridge was rejected. This latter incident even-
tually led to the withdrawal of San Mateo and Marin counties
from the district. In 1961, the State Legislature reduced the
majority approval requirement from two-thirds to 60 percent,
and in November of 1962, a $792 million bond issue was appoved
by a three-county vote of 61.2 percent. BARTD-thus became
"the largest locally-financed public works project in the
United States."2 0 The first revenue operation of BARTD opened
with the Fremont-aklarnd line in September, 1972.
Once the system is in full operation, the primary task
of building the 75-mile rapid transit system will be completed.
Its goals now are to expand upon this basic system that is to
include rail extensions, bus feeder and express services, and
to reinstate the counties of San Mateo and Marin. The most
difficult of these is the latter, and the District is currently
negotiating with the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District
for use of the bridge for a rapid transit line.
BARTD has weathered many stroms throughout the development
of its transportation program. The true worth of the $1 .522
billion rapid transit system will not be realized for some
time. However, the fact that the original goal has been accom-
plished is testimony supporting the District's present worth.
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The projected patronage next year is expected to be 200,000
passenger trips per day throughout the full 75-mile system.21
Significant is the fact that there are' three othcr transit
companies within the District; one of which, the San Francisco
Municipal Railway (MUNI) has a daily patronage of 350,000
riders per day.
Since BARTD is entirely new without precedent, service
in the Bay area has been obviously increased. The system is
expected to provide the following service from the Oakland
City Center Station (the central point of the system):2 2
South to Fremont - 24 miles - 30 minutes
North to Richmond - 11 miles - 19 minutes
East to Concord - 21 miles - 27 minutes
West to Daly City - 15 miles - 23 minutes
In addition there are four miles of trolley line in San Fran-
cisco to complete the 75-mile system. Fares range from 30
cents to $1.25, with special discounts for over-65 and under-
13 riders. When the system is in full operation, it is pro-
jected that the present fare structure will be adequate enough
to cover operational expenses. 23
BARTD is governed by an eleven member Board of Directors
consisiting of four members from the counties of Alameda and
San Francisco, and three members from Contra Costa County.
Two of each county's directors are appointed by the Board of
Supervisors from the respective county and the additional
members are chosen by a special "city selection committee from
each county. This committee is composed of the mayors of the
incorporated communities within each county. Each Director
serves a four year term.
It is interesting to note that the county of San Francisco
gave the funding vote the largest majority. Both Alameda and
Contra Costa counties failed to achieve the required 60 percent
majority, but the difference was made up in San Francisco.
The vote was:24
San Francisco 66.85%
Alameda 59.74
Contra Costa 54.19%
This was indicative of the problems BARTD was to experience in
working with local agencies and governments. Previously men-
tioned were the withdrawals of Marin and San Mateo counties.
Another issue arose from the- lack of authorization to acquire
and operate other public transportation systems in the Bay Area.
Unlike SEMTA in Detroit, BARTD is exclusively uni-modal. Conse-
quently, BARTD competes with the San Francisco Municipal Rail-
way (MUNI), the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (AC Transit),
and Greyhound operations within its jurisdiction. The BARTD
rapid transit system, will be particularly damaging to MUNI ts
128 million annual ridership operation. Due to its insistence
to the contrary, it is quite like.Ly that the MUNI system will
be merged with the BARTD system to provide a unified regional
transit system. 2 5
The transportation planning of the Bay Area come under
the control of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)
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and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). ABAG is
made.up of eighty-four of the ninety-one cities and eight of
the nine counties in the Bay area. All cities over 20,000
population in the Bay Area are members. Its General Assembly
consists of one representative from each county and city.
The Executive Committee consists of a mayor or councilman from
each county and a member of the Board of Supervisors from each
county. The Association assumed the responsibility for regional
planning in the Bay Area and has been officially designated as
the area's A-95 clearinghouse organization. The MTC was cre-
ated by the State Legislature in 1970 to develop regional com-
prehensive transportation planning and coordination. This
Commission consists of one member each appointed by ABAG and
the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, two members
each from the counties of San Francisco, Alameda, Contra
Costa, San Mateo, and Santa Clara, and one member each from
Marin, Solano Sonoma, and Napa. All future transportation
developments must receive MTC approval before proceeding.
The MTC is also responsible for allocating the 1/4-cent sales
tax earmarked for public transit. An ABAG-MTC combination is
undertaking a land-use transportation program with the MTC
reviewing all transportation related applications for Federal
funding before they are reviewed by ABAG.
Despite its strictly uni-modal approach, the BARTD system
is progressive in that it is one of the first "special district-
public. authority" transit combinations. This has fiscal advan-
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tages in that it can levy property taxes as a special, district,
and issue revenue bonds as a public authority. The Bay Area
also is fortunate to have active, effective regica'al organiza-
tions such as ABAG and MTC. Therefore, within its limited
capabilities, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District has been a
successful transit authority. However, vast improvements in
authority, functions, and jurisdiction can transform BARTD into
a more effective transit authority.
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Chapter V
Conclusions and Recommendations
Consolidating the public transportation facilities is
only-the firs step towards unifying all the transportation
services in a metropolitan area. Public authorities are but
one mechanism by which this can be done, but to daye they have
proved the most effective. The factors accounting for the
trend of public authority and special district creation do
not support the alternatives to authorities.
(1) The creation of public authorities is "far less formidable"
than the implementation of other solutions.
(2) Typically, authorities are the "last resort" after other
solutions have been unsuccessful.
(3) The creation of authorities usually does not threaten the
status of existing units of general government.
(4) Authorities are more businesslike and avoid a lot of the
red tape public agencies experience when it comes to
getting things done.
(5) Debt and tax limitations can be avoided by creating author-
ities to expand on tax revenues or to issue revenue bonds.
However, the trend towards authorities can be reversed should
the problems of jurisdiction, finances, and management in general
purpose governments be given more flexibilityand relevance.
Actions to be taken to overcome jurisdictional problems
include:2 (1) Changing municipal boundaries in order to create
more efficient service units. Yet, not all services can have
coinciding service districts and simultaneously maximize effi-
ciency. (2) Assign certain functions to a larger governmental
unit already in existence, such as the county. But, many
metropolitan areas encompass more than one county. Usually
only the state has the jurisdiction to include the entire metro-
politan region. (3) Organize a metropolitan federation similar
to that created in Toronto. Here the deprivation of local
home-rule, the effective disenfranchisement of minorities, and
the difficulty of creating such a unit weigh heavily against
this possibility. (4.) Assign certain functions to the state.
Arguments of regional favoritism and greater centralization
debilitate against this solution. (5) Inter-municipal coopera-
tion -- with several municipalities undertaking a project jointly.
Past experiences of distrust and a lack of binding agreements
suggest that this method is inefficient.
The problem of debt limitation is usually a matter which
can be improved upon by state legislatures. The debt limitation
should be modified to conform to modern conditions. George
Sause suggests that "the use of market value instead of the
assessed value of real property is a step in this direction,
but revenue sources other than property taxes should be included
in a consideration of debt carrying capacity."3
For the problems of management, there are three recommen-
dations to improve general government:4 (1) Free municipalities
from restrictions which authority operation has proven to be
unnecessary. (2) Make elective positions with municipalities
more attractive to prospective candidates for office. (3) Con-
duct a long-range educational program designed tc improve the
status of elected municipal officials.
Where these reforms cannot be accomplished, the public
authority is the best solution. -For a transit (or transporta-
tion) authority, the environment in which it exists can deter-
mine its success or failure. The Indiana Institute for Urban
Transportation lists conditions that create the "ideal" insti-
tutional environment for a public transit authority. Under
its guidelines, a transit authority should be5
(1) areawide with taxing and bonding powers
(2) independent from other levels of government'
(3) not subject to outside regulation
(4) a representative spectrum of board members
(5) exempt from taxes
(6) not compelled to cover expenses and capital solely
from the fare box
(7) to contract services to other levels of government
(8) have a large degree of control over parking along
the streets it utilizes and in terminal areas
An authority established under these guidelines should be
successful according to the Urban Transportation Institute.
For transit authorities where these conditions cannot be found,
it is recommended that those missing conditions be provided.
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In addition, rather than performing a single function as is
common among transit authorities, all modes of "public" trans-
portation should be included. Such a "transportation" authority
should be responsible for streets, highways, bridges, tunnels,
terminals, parking facilities, airport and harbor facilities,
trucking, and watercourse improvements as well as public transit.
These are all facilities that come under the label "public works"
and should be coordinated into one agency. This'will encourage
not only improved transportation for metropolitan areas, but
to encourage metropolitan transportation policies designed to
efficiently balance the various modes,.
Federal policy on authorities and transportation
Federal policy has historically favored the creation of
special districts and public authorities. The Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) found in 1964-
that of the "forty-three federal urban development aid programs
it had studied, about one-quarter of them have either encouraged,
or actually required, the establishment of special units." The
case studies examined in this paper revealed that state aid
programs also require regional special units to administer the
funds. This situation was viewed by many as detrimental to
the capabilities of general-purpose governments by giving
priority to special districts in the allocation of Federal funds.
Subsequently, Congress has initiated corrective action. Section
701g of the Housing Act of 1954 requires-areawide mechanisms
for planning to be composed of "predominantly elected officials."
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This gives emphasis to regional Councils of Government as the
primary agencies responsible for planning. In 1968, Congress
passed the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act which spelled
out the new Federal policy in even clearer terms. This legis-
lation requires that unless there are substantial reasons to
the contrary, "Federal agencies must make loans and grants to
units of general local government, rather than to special-
6
purpose units of local government." However, the ACIR noted
that many Federal programs still do encourage special district
funding, including:7
- Mass Transportation Loans established by the Housing Act
of 1961.
- Mass Transportation Demonstrations established by
Section 303 of the Housing Act of 1961.
Further emphasis of the new Federal policy was contained in
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. It author-
izes that revenue sharing funds be distributed to general-pur-
pose governments only.8
Technological innovation can also be expected to pro-
duce requirements for new institutional arrangements
on other fronts -- principally in coordinating trans-
portation planning efforts at the metropolitan and
megalopolitan levels. To attempt to replace existing
units of government with institutions of a regional
character would be politically unrealistic, at least
for the foreseeable future. But this does not pre-
clude the possibilities of using the leverage of
Federal support to encourage formalized, cooperati e
arrangements among existing governmental entities.
Federal action towards mass transit is becoming more and
more encouraging. In addition to the breakthroughs achieved
by the Housing Act of 1961 and the Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964., Federal mass transit funding is expected to soon
reach $3.1 billion annually due to the Urban Mass Transportation
Assistance Act of 1970 and the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973.
Operating cost assistance is opposed by the current Administra-
tion although Congress passed a bill in 1973 to provide such
financing. Of all the problems facing transit authorities,
funding is the most crucial. But with present trends in Federal
funding policy, it can be expected that public transit monies
will be even more forthcoming.
Concluding Conments
It appears that the transportation difficulties experi-
enced in our urban area can be solved only through regional
arrangements. Partial development of this concept has occurred
through the creation of regional transit, parking, port, and
highway authorities. Effective Federal and state policy
guidelines need to be established to improve present authorities
and urge the consolidation of transportation functions into one
all-encompassing authority for each metropolitan area. The
Federal Department of Transportation holds the greatest poten-
tial for such policy development; but since its creation in
1967, has not produced a national transportation policy.
For their lack of comprehensiveness, transportation authorities
have generally succeeded in initiating metropolitan transpor-
tation priorities; but without concerted Federal support, their
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major objectives cannot be accomplished. It is hoped that this
thesis demonstrates the need for and possibly encourage more
detailed study of transportation authorities leading to the
development of a national transportation policy.
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Appendix 1
Effecti.veness and Acceptability of Regional Service Delivery
Approaches
0 Informal Cooperation
Service contract/joint 4 4-
services agreement
04-4 00
-- Regional council of
local elected officials
Federally encouraged
substate district
State planning and
development district
Local special district
Transfer of functions
Annexation
Areawide special district/
public authority
"Umbrella" regional
council
Urban county
City-County consolidation
Federated areawide 0
government .0
el4-1
4'4
MC
0C
Number of Special Districts: 1972, 1967, 1962, and 1952
1967-72
5-year
Change
1962-72
10-year
Changze
1962 Change 19~2
1952-72
20-year
Change
93.6%
120.1
United States
Northeast
North Central
South
West
23,886 21,265
3,937
8,024
5,525
6,400
3,724
7,020
12.3%
14.3
18,322
3,339
6,028
22.4-
6,006 6.6 5,330
30.4%
15.8
33.1
58.5
20.1
12,339
1.,789
4,622
2,288
3,640
73.6
Source: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts
(Washington, 1973), p.
Region - 1972 1967
75.8 -.H.
1962 1952
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Appendix 3
Types of Special Districts: 1962, 1967, 1972
Percent Change
Type of District 1972 1967 1962 1967-72 1962-72
Single Function Districts
Cemetaries 1,496 1,397 1,283 7.1% 16.6%
School Buildings 1,085 956 915 13.5 18.6
Fire Protection 3,872 3,665 3,229 5.6 19.9
Highways 698 774 786 -9.8 -11.2
Health 257 234 231 9.8 11.3
Hospitals 665 537 418 22.0 56.7
Housing and Urban Renewal 2,270 1,565 1,099 45.0 106.6
Libraries 498 -410 340 21.5 14.0
Drainage 2,192 2,193 2,240 -0.0 -2.1
Flood Control 667 662 500 2.3 35.4
Irrigation and Water 966 904 781 6.9 23.7
Soil Conservation 2,564 2,571 2,461 0.3 4.o2
Other Natural Resources 231 209 309 10.5 -25.2
Parks and Recreation 749 613 488 22.2 53.5
Sewers 1,406 1,233 937 14.0 50.1
Water Supply 2,323 2,140 1,502 8.6 54.7
Electric Power 74 75 76 -1.3 -2.6
Gas Supply 48 37 30 29.7 60.0
Transit 33 14 10 135.7 230.0
Other 889 622 488 42.9 82.2
Multiple-Function Districts
Sewer and Water Supply 629 298 138 111.1 355.8
Natural Resource and Water 67 45 56 48.9 19.6
Other 207 110 120 88.2 72.5
-ource:. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate
Districts (Washington, 1973), p. 30.
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Appendix 4
Distribution of Special Districts Within
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
by Type: 1972
No. of% % of
Type of Special Special Within SMSA
District Districts SMSA Total
Total, SMSA Special7
Districts 7,842 32.8 100.0
Cemetary 157 10.5 2.0
School Building 619 57.1 7.9
Fire protection 1,491 38.5 19.0
Health 101 39.3 1.3
Hospitals 150 22.9 1.9
Highways 139 19.9 1.8
Housing 691 30.4 8.8
Drainage 436 19.9 5.6
Library 148 29.7 1.9
Other natural resources 92 39.8 1.2
Parks and Recreation 377 50.3 4.8
Flood Control 131 19.4 1.7
Irrigation and water 271 28.1 3.5
Sewers 822 58.5 10.5
Soil conservation 416 16.2 5.3
Other general functions 329 37.0 4.2
Water supply 877 37.8 11.2
Electric power 13 17.6 0.2
Gas supply 7 14.6 0.1
Transit 31 93.9 0.4
Natural resources and
water supply 44 65.7 0.6
Sewer and water 379 60.3 4.8
Other multiple functions 121 58.5 1.5
Source: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate
Districts (washington, 1973), p. 31.
Appendix 5
Governing Board Characteristics,
Selected Special Districts in the 72 Largest SMSA's
Selection of Governing Body
ChR?'actAT'1 ~tic
Region
Northeast
North Central
South
West
Function
Multifuntional
Transportation
Natural Resources
Soil Conservation
Sewers
Utilities
Parks/Recreation
Housing/Renewal
Ho spitals/Health
Other
Debt Size
- 10 Million
-t$10-24 Million
-425-49 Million
-"50-99 Million
+$100 Million
Type
State
State-Local
Local
State Local
Total Aptd Aptd
94.
18
29
23
24
9
12
16
14
11
9
6
3
6
8
53
11
7
13
10
35
23
36
State Local Stat
Elec.
Local
Aptd
17 25 25
10
1
5
1
4
5
3
1
2
0
0
0
0
2
7
LL
1
4
4
7
3
11
0
4
0
4
2
1
3
4
3
12
2
3
5
3
13 10
4 -2
0 13
3
8
5
9
4
1
5
4
2
6
2
0
1
0
13
4
2
4
2
5
7
13
0
5
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
2
1
0
3
0
3
2
1
Aptd Aptd
Elee Elec
1 9
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1*
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
State/
e Local
Aptd
Elc C
U
0
3
4
2
1
0
0
7
0
1
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
1
1
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Court
Aptd Other N/A
6
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
.1
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
2
0
0
i
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
4=
I
ChAraC Aristic A-DtdTota An d -An El * 6b 2 3
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